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Abstract Eastern Europe has traditionally been a region of emigration, sending thou-
sands of refugees and migrants to the more developed and democratic west. The recent 
democratization and rising afﬂuence of some eastern European countries, however, 
make them increasingly attractive destinations of migrant workers, slowly but surely 
turning them into immigrant societies. This article addresses the responses of political 
parties to the issue of immigration and immigrant integration. Through large-N 
quantitative ana-lyses of 11 eastern European countries using the Chapel Hill Expert 
Surveys, the 2009 European Election Study, the Database of Political Institutions and 
World Bank indica-tors, it analyzes the causes of immigration salience, as well as the 
reasons behind immi-gration and integration policy positions. The article argues that 
partisan and voter views on immigration in eastern Europe are guided by ideological 
views on ethnic minorities, which have been the traditional ‘out-groups’ in the region. 
Partisan positions on immi-gration and immigrant integration are consequently 
determined by underlying ideological principles concerning cultural openness and 
acceptance of ‘otherness’. Immigrants to eastern Europe are consequently viewed as 
the other ‘other’.
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Introduction
Eastern Europe has traditionally been a region of emigration, sending thousands of
refugees and migrants to the more developed and democratic west. The recent
democratization and rising afﬂuence of some eastern European countries, however,
make them increasingly attractive destinations of migrant workers, slowly but
surely turning them into immigrant societies. Although immigration and immigrant
integration issues do not ﬁgure prominently in current political discourse of the
region, the uniformly increasing migration trends in eastern Europe emphasize their
political potential. How do political parties and their voters respond to the
increasing presence of immigrants in the region? What determines the salience and
guides the formation of party preferences over immigration and immigrant
integration in eastern Europe?
This article addresses how political parties incorporate the issues of immigration
and immigrant integration into their political proﬁles. It argues that partisan and voter
views on immigration in eastern Europe are crucially formed by ideological views on
ethnic minorities, which have been the traditional ‘out-groups’ in the region. Partisan
positions on immigration and immigrant integration are consequently determined by
underlying ideological principles concerning cultural openness and acceptance of
‘otherness’. Immigrants to eastern Europe are thus viewed as the other ‘other’.
By emphasizing the importance of historical afﬁnities between political parties and
‘out-groups’, together with general socio-cultural outlooks of parties and voters, this
ideological argument contributes to the debate on the role of ideology and historical
cleavages in eastern European politics. This article demonstrates that on certain
socio-cultural issues – such as views on immigrants – eastern European politics are
signiﬁcantly ideologically structured.
This article carries out large-N quantitative analyses of 150 political parties in
11 eastern European countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – in 2006 and
2010. It complements these analyses with comparisons with western European
countries, as well as with analyses of voters in eastern and western Europe. This
article uses the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) on party positions, together with
the 2009 European Election Study, the Database of Political Institutions and World
Bank indicators. The ﬁrst section addresses the changing migratory trends in eastern
Europe. The next section presents the theoretical argument generating speciﬁc
ideological hypotheses concerning party positioning on and emphasis of immigration
and immigrant integration issues, while also presenting alternative strategic and
structural arguments. The third section discusses the data and methods, and the fourth
section presents the analyses and results. The ﬁnal section serves as a conclusion.
Eastern Europe and Migration
Throughout the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, eastern Europe had been a
region of emigration. After waves of migration to North America, the post-war
period sent many eastern Europeans seeking refuge from communist authoritarian-
ism in the democratic west. An estimated 6 million Poles and over half a million
Czechs left their countries during the communist era (Drbohlav, 2005; Iglicka and
Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010), while nearly 200 000 ﬂed Hungary only in the 3 months
after the 1956 uprising (Juhasz, 2003). More recently, eastern Europeans took
advantage of the European single market, spawning the proverbial ‘Polish plumber’,
supposedly providing cheap labor in the west. An estimated 700 000 eastern
Europeans migrated to the United Kingdom between 2004 and 2009, prompting
debate over east–west migration in the European Union (EU) (BBC, 2011).
The espoused view of notorious emigration from eastern Europe, however, masks
shifting migratory trends in the region. Evidence suggests that not only are fewer
eastern Europeans leaving their countries, there are signiﬁcant and increasing inﬂows
of migrants into some eastern member states of the EU (World Bank data). Most
migrants to the eastern EU member states come from the near abroad, namely,
Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, Moldova and Russia (Juhasz, 2003; Drbohlav, 2005;
Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010). However, increasingly more migrants from
Asia – particularly China – are arriving in the region (Nyíri, 2003; Iglicka and Ziolek-
Skrzypczak, 2010).
World Bank data on net migration in eastern Europe, depicted in Figure 1,
demonstrate that the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have been
experiencing net immigration since mid-1990s. The other countries have seen a
reversal of their migration outﬂows, which have been invariably slowing.1 In Poland,
the migration outﬂows switch to migration inﬂows by 2010. Consequently, ofﬁcials
at the Czech Ministry of the Interior, responsible for migration matters, conclude that
‘naturally people will start to notice as the issue [of immigration] grows … The
trends are obvious’ (Interview Michalova and Koutek, 2010).
Figure 1: Net Migration in Eastern Europe.
Source: World Bank Data.
Although the immigration trends in the region point in one direction, the way in
which the issues related to immigration enter the political agenda in eastern Europe is
much less clear. The following section considers the determinants of partisan
response to immigration in eastern Europe, as political parties are key actors in
translating social issues into salient, publicly contested political concerns (Lipset and
Rokkan, 1967).
Determinants of Party Response to Immigration
Immigration as a social phenomenon is a relative novelty in eastern Europe, and
consequently, it remains an under-explored political issue. The immigration trends
are, however, slowly generating increased public attention in the region.2 Political
parties are thus approaching a critical juncture when they must choose whether to
broach the immigration issue, and how.
This section addresses the considerations parties face when engaging new political
issues. It examines both the determinants of the salience of immigration and
immigrant integration, and the calculus behind party positioning on both immigration
and immigrant integration. Although arguing that partisan response to immigration in
eastern Europe is largely determined by ideological factors pertaining to party views
of ethnic minorities, the section also presents alternative strategic and structural
explanations.
Ideological Determinants
Political parties do not engage new political issues in a vacuum. When a new issue,
not aligned to the standing conﬂict lines of the party system, appears on the political
agenda, it increases the dimensionality of party competition. There are suddenly
more stances to take. Increased dimensionality is inherently costly. It reduces the
simplicity of political choices, taxing voter information, while increasing the
uncertainty of party support (Stimson, 2004, p. 63). Consequently, an introduction
of a cross-cutting issue creates pressure for alignment into existing positions.
Although some issue alignment may be arbitrary, there are logical linkages between
some political issues.3
A party’s response to a new issue is thus likely to proceed from its general
ideological commitment,4 which in turn is a product of underlying social cleavages
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Marks et al (2002, p. 568) argue that ‘political parties are
not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or
constituency pressures, but are organizations with embedded ideologies’. These
ideologies consequently form frames through which political parties engage new
political issues, and link them to their existing positions.
Although literature on eastern European parties questions the extent of socially
rooted ideologies after communism (c.f. Kitschelt, 1992, 1995; Evans and
Whiteﬁeld, 1993, 1998, 2000; Ost, 1993; Mair, 1997; Kitschelt et al, 1999;
Whiteﬁeld, 2002; Webb and White, 2007), there are social cleavages in eastern
Europe that survived the communist era, and that inform party positions today.
Although communism reshaped the socio-economic structure of society, it strikingly
preserved cultural, ethno-linguistic and religious divides – a fact witnessed by the
debates surrounding Czechoslovak separation, by the struggle for Baltic indepen-
dence, and by the Yugoslav wars. These cleavages feature in the ideological
orientation of political parties in eastern Europe, and – as I argue here – determine
partisan responses to new political issues, such as immigration.
The latent ideological frame underlying the issue of immigration and immigrant
integration is associated with approaches to ‘otherness’. Triandafyllidou (1999,
p. 66) suggests that national identity ‘presupposes the existence of Others, other
nations or individuals, who do not belong to the ingroup and from which the ingroup
seeks to differentiate itself in order to emphasise its distinctiveness and uniqueness’.
The elementary determinant of ideological positioning over immigration and
immigrant integration is the extent to which the entry and continuous presence of
others in a polity is acceptable. In the eastern European context, the traditional
national others have been ethnic minorities. Although present in the region for
centuries, ethnic minority rights issues have played a central role in political
competition in the region since 1989 (Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998). Recent research
suggests that partisan approaches to ethnic minorities have crucially structured party
competition in eastern Europe (Rovny, forthcoming). This leads to an ideological
hypothesis concerning party positions on immigration:
Hypothesis 1: Party positions on immigration and immigrant integration in
eastern Europe are determined by positions on ethnic minority
rights.
However, then how do preferences over immigration relate to the left–right
ideological spectrum in eastern Europe? In the west, van der Brug and van Spanje
(2009) demonstrate a strong monotonous relationship between the economic left–
right dimension (summarizing views over government involvement in the economy)
and views on immigration, where the left supports immigration and multiculturalism,
whereas the right opposes it. Although scholars of eastern European party politics
also consider the economic left–right as a signiﬁcant dimension of political
competition (Kitschelt, 1992, 1995; Markowski, 2006; Marks et al, 2006), the
uniform relationship between economic placement and preferences over immigration
is unlikely to be repeated in eastern Europe.
The relationship between economic left–right placement and views on ethnic
minority rights in eastern Europe is determined by party relationships to communist
federalism and to the most politically salient ethnic groups (Rovny, forthcoming).
In places where the main ethnic minority consists of members of the nation that
formed the center of a communist federation (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia and Slovenia),
left parties tolerate or even support the ethnic minorities, or develop multi-ethnic
proﬁles, whereas the right espouses ethnic nationalism.
This is because in these communist federal peripheries the opposition to
communism assumes both a pro-market and anti-federal character. Anti-communist
forces adopt right-wing economic views, while pushing for national autonomy and
ﬁnally national independence. Simultaneously, in these countries, left parties have a
historical association with multinationalism, as the communist federal regime managed
and co-opted ethnic minorities, engaging them through various power-sharing
mechanisms (see Leff, 1999; Zakosek, 2000). The left thus adopts multinational
outlooks, potentially turning into the representatives of ethnic minorities. Conse-
quently, left party afﬁnities with ethnic minorities encourage left-wing multicultural-
ism, which later inform the left’s views on immigration issues.
On the contrary, in countries with either politically insigniﬁcant ethnic minority
populations or where the main ethnic minority comes from other nations, than
ex-federal centers (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia), left parties have no particular ethnic afﬁnities. They consequently are not
induced to cultural openness. They either ignore these issues, or utilize nationalist
chauvinism to revive their compromised left-wing ideology after 1989. This leads the
left toward conservative stances regarding all ‘others’. Conversely, the opposition to
communism assumes market economic outlooks combined with social liberalism,
making right-wing parties more sympathetic to concerns of ethnic minorities. These
positions consequently inform their views toward immigrants.
Given the hypothesized expectation of intimate connection between preferences
over immigration and ethnic minority rights, it is logical to expect that the relation-
ship between economic left–right placement and immigration is similarly condi-
tioned by communist federalism and ethnic afﬁnities.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between economic left–right positions and posi-
tions on immigration and immigrant integration is conditioned by
experiences with communist federalism and ethnic afﬁnities. In
countries where the main ethnic minority consists of members of
the nation that dominated the country under a communist federa-
tion, the economic left is associated with more liberal views on
immigration, while the right is more conservative. In other coun-
tries, the relationship is inverted.
The salience of the immigration issue is also likely to be determined by the
salience of the issue of ethnic minorities. Where ethnic minority rights issues play a
signiﬁcant role in political competition, the issue of admitting and integrating
immigrants becomes amalgamated into questions concerning the acceptance and
incorporation of all others.
Hypothesis 3: The salience of immigration and immigrant integration is deter-
mined by the salience of ethnic minority rights.
Finally, the salience of the immigration issue is additionally determined by
positioning on immigration. Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) present a directional
theory of voting, where party (or candidate, or voter) placement reﬂects the intensity
with which they care about a certain side of a political issue. Here ‘[p]arties can
be thought to differ in intensity based on how clearly they present their views and the
extent to which they stress the issue. Party intensity serves as a means of exciting
voter interest and attention’ (MacDonald et al, 1991, p. 1109). ‘Intensity’, can be
understood as both heightened issue salience, and extreme issue positioning. Parties
that particularly invest in certain issues take outlying positions on these issues (see
Rovny, 2012). It is consequently reasonable to expect that parties that hold extreme
positions on an issue also tend to emphasize it:
Hypothesis 4: Parties with outlying positions on immigration are more likely to
emphasize immigration issues.
Strategic Determinants
Although ideological arguments provide intuitive explanation of how parties
engage new political issues, scholarship on party strategies suggests that political
tactics, rather than entrenched ideological proﬁles, determine partisan response to
new issues. This line of study stresses that political parties stand to gain from
engaging and emphasizing untapped political issues, which may reshape party
competition and redirect votes. Riker (1982, 1986) suggests that political parties
raise new issues into political discourse in order to upset the status quo and capture
voter attention. Similarly, issue ownership theory and salience theory expect
parties to alter vote choice by increasing the salience of political issues on which
the party holds an advantageous position, or on which it has better credentials
(Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge et al, 1987; Petrocik, 1996).
Niche party literature extends this argument by suggesting that electorally
marginal, small parties have an increased incentive, and greater ease, in introducing
novel issues into political competition. This is because they have more to gain from
upsetting the established lines of conﬂict with new issues, on which their mainstream
opponents may have no deﬁned positions (Meguid, 2005, 2008). In addition, niche
parties may be advantaged in their ability to raise new political issues. They tend to
be younger organizations, less encumbered by long-standing ideological proﬁles and
membership structures (Rovny and Edwards, 2012). This allows them to better
pursue narrowly deﬁned political aims neglected by mainstream parties.
In eastern Europe fewer parties have entrenched, historically deﬁned ideological
platforms, and most party organizations are weaker and party membership lower
(Van Biezen, 2003). Consequently, many parties face low institutional barriers to
issue introduction. Combined with higher levels of electoral volatility in the region
(Sikk, 2005; Tavits, 2008), often punishing even the established mainstream,
many parties may behave more like niche parties, ready to exploit new issues for
political gain. The mechanism, nonetheless, remains the same. The niche literature
would expect that in eastern Europe, new issues, such as immigration, are more
likely to be raised by electorally marginal parties. Party vote share may thus
explain immigration and immigrant integration salience (marginal parties care
more about immigration and immigrant integration), as well as immigration policy
positions (marginal parties are more likely to oppose immigration and immigrant
integration).
Mainstream parties may, however, respond to the ‘contagion’ from niche parties,
such as the radical right. Although parties face varying strategic considerations in
the context of radical right party success (Green-Pedersen and Kogstrup, 2008;
Bale et al, 2010), Van Spanje (2010) ﬁnds that the radical right ‘contagion’ affects
entire party systems. Consequently, the rise of the radical right has the potential to
inﬂuence party positions on immigration in the entire party system. The system-
level vote share of radical right parties may consequently determine immigration
and immigrant integration salience (greater vote share of radical right parties leads
to greater immigration and integration salience), as well as immigration and
integration policy positions (greater vote share of radical right parties leads to more
restrictive views on immigration, and to more assimilationist views on immigrant
integration).
Structural Determinants
Besides ideological and strategic determinants, party response to new issues may be
importantly conditioned by structural factors. Breunig and Luedtke (2008) argue that
institutional structure of the party system and of the country determine orientations
toward immigration, pointing to the critical role of institutional veto points. The
authors demonstrate that governing parties in institutional systems that limit the
inﬂuence of the majority are less likely to introduce conservative immigration
policies. Consequently, institutional variables, such as the number of checks and
balances, legislative fractionalization, and electoral system are important determi-
nants of party positions on immigration.
Finally, partisan emphasis on immigration is likely to directly reﬂect the level of
immigration into a country. Givens and Luedtke (2005) suggest that proximity to
immigrants affects both salience of immigration and preferences over immigration
and immigrant integration policies. Where immigration is higher, it is more likely to
be a salient issue, and parties may adopt more restrictive positions on immigration
and more assimilationist views on immigrant integration.
Data and Methods
To test the theoretical propositions while controlling for alternative explanations, this
article carries out quantitative data analyses on 150 political parties5 from 11 eastern
European countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.6 These analyses are also
compared with analyses of 177 western European parties. The article combines data
on party positions, country characteristics and voter preferences. With respect to
parties, it uses the 2006 and 2010 iterations of CHES which is the most
comprehensive expert data set on party positions available (Hooghe et al, 2010;
Bakker et al, 2012).
The choice of an expert survey as a data source on party positioning is warranted
thanks to its general advantages: (i) experts evaluate not only pre-electoral statements
of parties, but also partisan actions; (ii) expert surveys have generally greater coverage
of smaller political parties than the commonly used alternative – the Comparative
Manifesto Project data (Volkens et al, 2012); (iii) tests of validity suggest that expert
surveys provide consistent measures that converge with other measures of party
positioning (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Bakker et al, 2012).
I complement this party data with information on country characteristics, such as
migration trends and political institutions, available from the World Bank and the
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001). Finally, in order to test some
of the above hypotheses using alternative data, I use the 2009 European Election
Study (EES, 2009) to address the effect of voter preferences over immigration and
immigrant integration on vote choice.
The CHES provide direct measures of party positions and salience on the
dependent variables – immigration and immigrant integration. The survey also includes
measures of party positioning and salience on ethnic minority rights, as well as general
information on economic left–right placement, party families and vote share. To capture
the impact of radical right parties on the party system, system-level vote share of radical
right parties is operationalized as the percentage of vote for all radical right parties in the
dataset in the previous election in a given country. In modeling the impact of political
institutions on party positions, this article follows Breunig and Luedtke (2008) by
utilizing institutional measures from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al,
2001). The models consequently control for: the number of checks and balances;
legislative fractionalization; electoral threshold and the presence of proportional
representation. The analyses of eastern European cases omit the proportional represen-
tation variable since all analyzed countries include some proportional representation
rules. Proximity to immigrants is captured by net migration. However, since it is
reasonable to expect that an increase by 100 000 new migrants would have signiﬁcantly
different effect in Poland than in Slovenia, the models use a standardized measure where
net migration is divided by the population of a given country. Table A1 in the Appendix
contains the detailed descriptive statistics of these variables. Finally, since the models
pool data from 2006 and 2010, I include a dummy variable for year 2006, in order to
capture any variance caused by idiosyncratic time differences.
To test the posited hypotheses, the article performs a series of OLS regressions with
cluster-corrected standard errors, a choice motivated by the need to correct for the
possibility that observations from the same country in different years may be
dependent on each other (Primo et al, 2007). All of the models presented below have
been also estimated using hierarchical linear models, where the intercepts were allowed
to vary randomly in order to capture the country-speciﬁc nature of the data
(Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p. 234; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). The
hierarchical linear models produced substantively identical results to the OLS models
using cluster-corrected standard errors (see the Appendix for details).
Analyses and Results
The ﬁrst analysis demonstrates the relationship between party positioning on ethnic
minorities and preferences over immigration and immigrant integration. Supporting
Hypothesis 1, Table 1 demonstrates that party positions on both immigration and
immigrant integration are signiﬁcantly predicted by party positions in ethnic minority
rights. This impact is substantively profound. As the three positional measures of
immigration, integration and ethnic minorities are on the same 0–10 scale, the model
coefﬁcients show that one unit change in ethnic minority preferences (that is a
10 per cent shift on the scale) changes views on immigration by 0.54 units (that is by
5.4 per cent on the scale). The effect on immigrant integration (β= 0.82) is even
stronger. With R2s of 0.64 and 0.80, the models fare very well in capturing the
variance in immigration and integration positioning.
The next set of models turns to consider Hypothesis 2, positing a relationship
between economic left–right placement and preferences over immigration and
immigrant integration. The literature on western Europe suggests a monotonous
relationship where the economic left champions immigration and multiculturalism,
while the economic right supports immigration limits and immigrant assimilation.
The argument here, which connects preferences over immigration and immigrant
integration to ethnic minority rights in eastern Europe, suggests that party positions
on immigration and integration are affected by party afﬁnities with ethnic minority
groups. Where left parties have historical connections to ethnic minority groups, they
are induced to general cultural openness and acceptance of ‘others’, be they ethnic
minorities or immigrants. In these cases, the association between economic left–right
and immigrant positions should copy the western European pattern. Where left
parties do not have historical afﬁnities with ethnic minority groups, they are not
induced to adopt culturally liberal positions, often opting to use minorities as political
scapegoats instead. In these cases, the association between economic left–right
placement and immigration should have the opposite sign.
Table 2 presents models supporting Hypothesis 2. These models include political
parties from across western and eastern Europe,7 in order to demonstrate the intra-
regional variance in eastern Europe, where some countries resemble their western,
rather than eastern, European counterparts. In eastern European countries where left
parties have historical afﬁnities with ethnic minorities as these originate from the old
communist federal center (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia), the relationship
between economic left–right placement and immigration is the same as in western
Europe (positive relationship). Here the economic left supports greater immigration
and favors multicultural approaches to immigrant integration, whereas the economic
right is anti-immigrant and assimilationist. Eastern European countries, where left
parties have no afﬁnity with ethnic minority groups, as these do not originate from
a federal center, (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania
and Slovakia) stand apart. Here the economic left opposes immigration and is
Table 1: Predicting party positions on immigration and immigrant integration
(1) (2)
Positioning on immigration Positioning on integration
Ethnic minorities 0.537*** 0.823***
(0.074) (0.071)
Econ left–right −0.073 −0.033
(0.063) (0.065)
Vote share −0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.007)
Vote for radical right 0.031 −0.007
(0.024) (0.014)
Checks −0.129** −0.069
(0.050) (0.133)
Fractionalization 2.945** 1.145
(0.981) (1.234)
Threshold −0.011 −0.043**
(0.013) (0.015)
Migration 21.398* −20.144
(10.442) (22.432)
Year 2006 −0.011 −0.140
(0.179) (0.180)
Constant 1.375 1.338**
(0.857) (0.534)
Observations 153 150
R2 0.642 0.799
Note: Robust cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
Source: CHES 2006 and 2010. World Bank. Database on Political Institutions. Immigration, integration
and ethnic minorities positions range from liberal to conservative.
assimilationist, whereas the economic right supports immigration and multicultural-
ism (negative relationship).
A similar pattern, supporting Hypothesis 2, arises when analyzing voter prefer-
ences over immigration and immigrant integration across western Europe and the two
different parts of eastern Europe. This analysis performs logit models to predict the
Table 2: Predicting the relationship between immigration, integration and economic left–right placement
(1) (2)
Positioning on immigration Positioning on integration
Econ left–right in western Europe 0.667*** 0.634***
partial slope (0.083) (0.082)
Econ left–right in eastern Europe 0.255* 0.436*
(Left parties with ethnic afﬁnity) (0.143) (0.239)
partial slope
Econ left–right in eastern Europe −0.237*** −0.260**
(Left parties without ethnic afﬁnity) (0.075) (0.106)
partial slope
Eastern Europe with ethnic afﬁnity 2.538*** 1.551
(0.811) (1.339)
Eastern Europe without ethnic afﬁnity 5.162*** 5.325***
(0.476) (0.693)
Vote share 0.014 0.006
(0.009) (0.009)
Vote for radical right 0.041** 0.039**
(0.016) (0.014)
Checks −0.027 −0.066
(0.081) (0.097)
Fractionalization 1.605 1.438
(1.187) (1.105)
Threshold −0.035** −0.055***
(0.013) (0.012)
Proportional representation −1.092*** −2.378***
(0.355) (0.298)
Migration 12.725 18.257
(10.179) (11.426)
Year 2006 −0.176 −0.018
(0.129) (0.157)
Constant 1.357* 3.213***
(0.736) (0.827)
Observations 328 325
R2 0.361 0.293
Note: Robust cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
Source: CHES 2006 and 2010. World Bank. Database on Political Institutions. Immigration and
integration positions range from liberal to conservative. Partial Slopes estimated using Stata’s margins
command.
vote for left-wing parties (operationalized as communist, socialist or social demo-
cratic parties) versus right-wing parties (operationalized as Christian democratic,
liberal or conservative)8 across the three regions under consideration. The models
predict left vote using voter preferences on immigration (q67) and immigrant
integration (q56), while controlling for left–right self-placement (q47), gender
(q102), age (q103), education (v200), income (q120) and whether the respondent
considers him/herself to be a member of a minority (q108), available from the 2009
European Election Study.
Figure 2 summarizes the results across the three regions, while the details are
available in Table A3 in the Appendix. In western Europe, vote for left parties is
signiﬁcantly determined by preferences over immigration and immigrant integration.
Those favoring liberal immigration and integration policies are more likely to vote
for left parties than those opposed (top left panel in Figure 2). The contrary is true in
eastern European countries where left parties do not have afﬁnities with ethnic
minority groups. Here voters are more likely to vote for the left if they support
restrictive immigration and assimilationist integration policies (bottom left panel in
Figure 2: Effect of immigration and integration preferences on left vote.
Source: 2009 European Election Study. The models control for left-right self-placement, gender, age,
education, income and minority status. Predicted probabilities with 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 2). In those eastern European countries where left parties have afﬁnities with
ethnic minority groups, preferences over immigration and integration do not predict
left vote. Instead, left vote is signiﬁcantly predicted by whether the voter is a member
of ethnic minority, with ethnic minorities supporting left parties (top right panel in
Figure 2).
These results underline the different electoral dynamics across eastern Europe
where immigration and integration issues interact with ethnic minority issues in
intricate ways. They highlight the fact that in eastern European countries, where the
left does not have an afﬁnity to ethnic minority groups, immigration issues
signiﬁcantly affect vote choice and, consequently, election outcomes. Interestingly,
in eastern European countries where left parties have historical ethnic afﬁnities, left
vote is predicted not by policy preferences, but by ethnic minority status.
Simultaneously, we know from Table 2 that in this region of eastern Europe left
parties take liberal stances on immigration and integration issues. Furthermore,
ethnic minorities in these countries are signiﬁcantly more open to immigration and
hold more liberal views on immigrant integration compared with the majority
population.9 Ultimately, these results emphasize the intimate ideological connection
between ethnic minority rights, and immigration and immigrant integration in eastern
Europe.
The ﬁnal analysis addresses the salience of immigration and integration issues in
eastern Europe. Hypothesis 3 posits that immigration and integration salience is
predicted by the salience of ethnic minority rights. Hypothesis 4 expects that parties
with outlying positions on immigration and integration are more likely to emphasize
immigration and integration issues. The models thus predict immigration and
integration salience by position and position squared, as well as ethnic salience,
while controlling for alternative explanations.
Table 3 presents evidence supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4. The salience of ethnic
minority rights is a signiﬁcant predictor of immigration and integration salience. It is
particularly strong in predicting the salience of immigrant integration, where a unit
change in ethnic salience (that is a 10 per cent change along the scale of ethnic
salience) leads to over 0.41 unit shift (4.1 per cent) in integration salience. The table,
showing a signiﬁcant effect of the square terms of immigration and integration
position, also supports Hypothesis 4.10 Parties that hold extreme views on immigra-
tion and integration tend to care about the topics more than parties taking centrist
positions. Figure 3, showing the detailed effect of positioning on salience, however,
moderates this claim. The ﬁgure demonstrates that, although a curvilinear relation-
ship posited by Hypothesis 4 is indeed present, parties at the more conservative end
of the spectrum – those opposing immigration and supporting immigrant assimilation
– tend to put signiﬁcantly greater emphasis on these issues than parties on the liberal
extreme.
The results generally underline the centrality of ideology in the formation of
preferences on issues of immigration and immigrant integration. The importance of
ideological coherence between issues is exempliﬁed by the results showing that
immigrant integration positioning and salience tend to be predicted by ethnic
minority positioning and salience slightly better than immigration (compare across
the two models in Tables 1 and 3). This outcome is logical since the issue of
immigrant integration, concerning the extent to which ‘out-groups’ should adapt to
majority culture, is conceptually very close to the issue of ethnic minority rights,
Table 3: Predicting immigration and integration salience
(1) (2)
Immigration salience Integration salience
Position on immigration −1.102*** —
(0.239) —
Position on immigration2 0.135*** —
(0.019) —
Position on integration — −0.459
— (0.329)
Position on integration2 — 0.062*
— (0.032)
Ethnic salience 0.197*** 0.414***
(0.053) (0.062)
Econ left–right 0.051* 0.008
(0.027) (0.049)
Vote share 0.006 0.005
(0.008) (0.008)
Vote for radical right 0.043 0.048
(0.045) (0.037)
Checks 0.096 0.024
(0.115) (0.131)
Fractionalization −2.722 −0.904
(3.140) (3.524)
Threshold −0.023* −0.017
(0.012) (0.024)
Migration 22.527 27.247**
(23.221) (10.627)
Year 2006 0.050 1.931***
(0.428) (0.486)
Constant 5.858** 2.369
(2.000) (2.287)
Observations 153 150
R2 0.661 0.683
Note: Robust cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
Source: CHES 2006 and 2010. World Bank. Database on Political Institutions. Immigration and
integration positions range from liberal to conservative.
which reﬂects on the extent to which ‘out-groups’ should be afforded exceptional
treatment, such as minority language use.
Conclusions
When incorporating the issues of immigration and immigrant integration into their
proﬁles, political parties in eastern Europe reﬂect their ideological principles
regarding cultural openness and acceptance of ‘otherness’. Although immigration is
a relatively new social phenomenon in eastern Europe, eastern European parties and
voters have keenly developed preferences on how inclusive or exclusive their
societies should be with respect to ‘others’. These preferences over ‘otherness’ have
been shaped by historical views on and engagements with ethnic minorities, which
have formed the traditional ‘out-groups’ in eastern Europe.
Views on ethnic minority rights are thus a strong determinant of preferences over
immigration and immigrant integration. Parties follow their positions on ethnic
minority rights when formulating their responses to immigrants. Similarly, parties
that are deeply concerned about ethnic minority rights also tend to be more engaged
in the issues of immigration and – even more so – immigrant integration. The issue of
Figure 3: Effect of immigration and integration positioning on salience.
Source: CHES. Predicted values with 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. The models control for ethnic
salience, economic left-right placement, vote share, vote for the radical right, checks, fractionalization,
threshold, migration and year 2006.
immigrant integration is particularly well predicted by views on ethnic minority
rights, which is likely due to the conceptual similarity between the cultural
acceptance of distinct ethnic minorities and the acceptance of distinct immigrants.
The effect of the conceptual link between these two issues further underlines the
importance of ideology in issue incorporation.
The association between views on ethnic minorities and views on immigrants
creates two distinct patterns connecting left–right placement with positions on
immigration in eastern Europe. In eastern countries where left parties have historical
afﬁnities with ethnic minorities, the left holds liberal socio-cultural views, accepts
higher levels of immigration and champions multiculturalism, whereas the right
adopts conservative views – very much like in western Europe. On the contrary, in
countries where left parties do not have any speciﬁc ethnic minority afﬁliations, the
left either ignores ethnic minorities or uses them as political scapegoats. Here the left
is culturally conservative, and is subsequently not induced to adopt pro-immigrant
stances. In these countries, it is the right that supports greater cultural openness,
multiculturalism and liberal immigration policies.
The analyses presented here underline the centrality of ideological preferences in
the formation of positions on new political issues, even in eastern Europe, where the
impact of ideology has been considered precarious at best. This argument points to
the importance of historical cleavages and ideological associations between various
socio-cultural issues. It is critical that literature on eastern European party competi-
tion recognize that – despite the socially levelling experience of communism –
eastern European societies retained a number of critical socio-cultural divides that
determine how new political issues enter the politics of the region. The approaches to
ethnic minorities have formulated the ideological principles concerning the ‘other’.
These principles are now applied to new-coming immigrants who thus become the
other ‘other’.
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Notes
1 Note that the exceptional 1995 ﬁgure for Croatia is caused by migration in the context of the Yugoslav
wars.
2 Although about 5 per cent of respondents from eastern EU member states consider immigration-related
issues (such as labour migration, national way of life or national immigration policy) as pressing, about
33 per cent report a perceived increase in immigration. Furthermore, as many as 84 per cent of these
respondents see their perceived immigration increase to be for the worse (EES, 2009).
3 While Stimson (2004, p. 68) suggests that consistency in issue bundling is learned, and no issue
connections are natural, Carmines and Stimson (1989, p. 116) underline the logical association
between government action in the area of social welfare on the one hand, and racial concerns on the
other.
4 This article understands ideology as a set of established political preferences held by a political actor –
a party, or a voter.
5 The CHES data include all parties that have at least one representative in the national parliament; at
least one representative in the European Parliament; or that received at least 3 per cent of the vote in the
last national election. All these parties are included in the analyses here, with the exception of the vote
choice analysis reported in Figure 2, which uses left- and right-wing voters only (see Table A2 in the
Appendix for details).
6 Ideally I would include all European countries that transitioned from communism to democracy after
1989, however, data limitations conﬁne the analyses to these 11 countries.
7 Please note that the two models testing Hypothesis 2 at the party level exclude Belgium, Germany and
the United Kingdom, because of the missing data on the institutional control variables. All eastern
countries under study are included.
8 Table A2 in the Appendix provides the list of parties included.
9 On immigration (0–4), ranging from liberal to conservative, ethnic minorities score 2.38, whereas the
majority scores 2.56, t= 3.3299, P<0.000. On integration (0–4), ranging from liberal to conservative,
ethnic minorities score 2.65, whereas the majority scores 3.19, t= 11.8162, P<0.000.
10 Although the estimate for the curvilinear effect of integration positioning is signiﬁcant only at the
0.1 level, the hierarchical linear model in Table A6 of the Appendix shows signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
References
Bakker, R. et al (2012) Measuring party positions in Europe: The chapel hill expert survey trend ﬁle
1999–2010. Party Politics, advanced online publication 29 November, doi:10.1177/1354068812462931.
Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K.R. and Sitter, N. (2010) If you can’t beat them, join
them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in
Western Europe. Political Studies 58(3): 410–426.
BBC (2011) Eastern European migrants ‘add 5bn’ to Britain’s GDP, http://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-13251614, accessed 2 June 2014.
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. (2001) New tools in comparative political
economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165–176.
Breunig, C. and Luedtke, A. (2008) What motivates the gatekeepers? Explaining governing party
preferences on immigration. Governance 21(1): 123–146.
Budge, I., Robertson, D. and Hearl, D. (1987) Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of
Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Budge, I. and Farlie, D. (1983) Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in
Twenty-Three Democracies. London: Allen & Unwin.
Carmines, E.G. and Stimson, J.A. (1989) Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American
Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Drbohlav, D. (2005) The Czech Republic: From Liberal Policy to EU Membership, http://www
.migrationinformation.org/Proﬁles/display.cfm?ID=325, accessed 3 June 2014.
European Election Study (EES) (2009) http://eeshomepage.net/home/, accessed 3 June 2014.
Evans, G. and Whiteﬁeld, S. (1993) Identifying the bases of party competition in Eastern Europe. British
Journal of Political Science 23(4): 521–548.
Evans, G. and Whiteﬁeld, S. (1998) The structuring of political cleavages in post-communist societies: The
case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Political Studies 46(1): 115–139.
Evans, G. and Whiteﬁeld, S. (2000) Explaining the formation of electoral cleavages in post-communist
democracies. In: H.D. Klingemann, E. Mochman and K. Newton (eds.) Elections in Central and
Eastern Europe: The First Wave. Berlin: Sigma, pp. 36–70.
Givens, T. and Luedtke, A. (2005) European immigration policies in compeartive perspective: Issue
salience, partisanship and immigrant rights. Comparative European Politics 3(1): 1–22.
Green-Pedersen, C. and Krogstrup, J. (2008) Immigration as a political issue in Denmark and Sweden.
European Journal of Political Research 47(5): 610–634.
Hooghe, L. et al (2010) Reliability and validity of measuring party positions: The chapel hill expert
surveys of 2002 and 2006. European Journal of Political Research 49(5): 687–703.
Iglicka, K. and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, M. (2010) EU membership highlights Poland’s migration challenges,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Proﬁles/display.cfm?ID=800, accessed 3 June 2014.
Ishiyama, J.T. and Breuning, M. (1998) Ethnopolitics in the New Europe. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub.
Juhasz, J. (2003) Hungary: Transit country between east and west, http://www.migrationinformation.org/
Proﬁles/display.cfm?ID=181, accessed 3 June 2014.
Kitschelt, H. (1995) Formation of party cleavages in post-communist democracies. Party Politics
1(4): 447.
Kitschelt, H. (1992) Formation of party systems in East Central Europe. Politics and Society 20(1):
7–50.
Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R. and Toka, G. (1999) Post-Communist Party Systems:
Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Leff, C.S. (1999) Democratization and disintegration in multinational states. World Politics 51(2):
205–235.
Lipset, S.M and Rokkan, S. (1967) Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An
Introduction. New York: The Free Press.
MacDonald, S.E., Listhaug, O. and Rabinowitz, G. (1991) Issues and party support in multiparty systems.
American Political Science Review 85(4): 1107–1131.
Mair, P. (1997) Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Markowski, R. (2006) The polish elections of 2005: Pure chaos or a restructuring of the party system?West
European Politics 29(4): 814–832.
Marks, G., Wilson, C.J. and Ray, L. (2002) National political parties and European integration. American
Journal of Political Science 46(3): 585–594.
Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Nelson, M. and Edwards, E.E. (2006) Party competition and European integration
in the east and west: Different structure, same causality. Comparative Political Studies 39(2): 155.
Meguid, B. (2005) Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party
success. American Political Science Review 99(3): 347–359.
Meguid, B. (2008) Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western
Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Michalova and Koutek (2010) Ministry for the Interior, Czech Republic. Interview with author, 29 June.
Nyíri, P. (2003) Chinese migration to Eastern Europe. International Migration 41(3): 239–265.
Ost, D. (1993) The politics of interest in post-communist East Europe. Theory and Society 22(4): 453–485.
Petrocik, J.R. (1996) Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study. American Journal
of Political Science 40(3): 825–850.
Primo, D.M., Jacobsmeier, M.L. and Milyo, J. (2007) Estimating the impact of state policies and
institutions with mixed-level data. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 7(4): 446–459.
Rabe-Hesketh, S. and Skrondal, A. (2008) Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata. College
Station: Stata Press.
Rabinowitz, G. and MacDonald, S.E. (1989) A directional theory of issue voting. American Political
Science Review 83(1): 93–121.
Riker, W.H. (1982) Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and
the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: WH Freeman.
Riker, W.H. (1986) The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rovny, J. (2012) Who emphasizes and who blurs? Party strategies in multidimensional competition.
European Union Politics 13(2): 269–292.
Rovny, J. (forthcoming) Communism, federalism and ethnic minorities: Explaining party competition
patterns in Eastern Europe. World Politics, in press.
Rovny, J. and Edwards, E.E. (2012) Struggle over dimensionality: Political competition in Western and
Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies 26(1): 56–74.
Sikk, A. (2005) How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe. European
Journal of Political Research 44(3): 391–412.
Steenbergen, M. and Marks, G. (2007) Evaluating expert surveys. European Journal of Political Research
46(3): 347–366.
Steenbergen, M.R. and Jones, B.S. (2002) Modeling multilevel data structures. American Journal of
political Science 46(1): 218–237.
Stimson, J.A. (2004) Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Tavits, M. (2008) On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in central and
Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research 47(5): 537–555.
Triandafyllidou, A. (1999) Nation and immigration: A study of the Italian press discourse. Journal for the
Study of Race, Nation and Culture 5(1): 65–88.
Van Biezen, I. (2003) Political Parties in New Democracies. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Van der Brug, W. and Van Spanje, J. (2009) Immigration, Europe and the ‘new’ cultural dimension.
European Journal of Political Research 48(3): 309–334.
Van Spanje, J. (2010) Contagious parties. Party Politics 16(5): 563–586.
Volkens, A., Lacewell, O., Lehmann, P., Regel, S., Schultze, H. and Werner, A. (2012) ‘The Manifesto
Data Collection.’ Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Berlin, Germany: Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
Webb, P.D. and White, S. (2007) Party Politics in New Democracies. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Whiteﬁeld, S. (2002) Political cleavages in post-communist politics. Annual Review of Political Science
5(1): 181–200.
Zakosek, N. (2000) Ethnic War and Disempowerment: The Serb Minority in Croatia. In: J. Stein (ed.) The
Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-communist Europe: State-building, Democracy, and
Ethnic Mobilization. Armonk: ME Sharpe, Inc.
Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics (eastern Europe)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Source
Immigration position 5.30 1.55 2.00 9.27 CHES
Integration position 5.41 2.08 1.00 10.00 CHES
Immigration salience 4.02 1.48 0.75 9.67 CHES
Integration salience 4.85 1.90 1.14 10.00 CHES
Ethnic minority rights position 4.80 2.26 0.00 9.93 CHES
Ethnic minority rights salience 5.71 1.95 2.25 10.00 CHES
Economic left–right 4.90 1.97 0.33 8.83 CHES
Vote share 12.49 10.49 0.00 45.35 CHES
Vote for radical right 4.86 5.08 0.00 16.67 CHES
Checks and balances 4.27 1.36 2.00 7.00 DPI
Fractionalization 0.75 0.09 0.52 0.84 DPI
Threshold 7.04 6.75 0.00 25.00 DPI
Proportional representation 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 DPI
Net migration/Population 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.02 WB
Sources: CHES=Chapel Hill Expert Surveys; DPI=Database on Political Institutions; WB=World
Bank.
Table A2: Party classiﬁcation
Left parties Right parties
Country Party Country Party Country Party
Austria SPO Austria OVP Latvia V
Belgium PS Belgium CD&V Lithuania TS
Bulgaria KzB Belgium CDH Lithuania LCS
Czech Republic CSSD Belgium VLD Lithuania LRLS
Czech Republic KSCM Belgium MR Lithuania DP
Denmark SD Bulgaria DSB Lithuania NS
Denmark SF Bulgaria RZS The Netherlands CDA
Estonia SDE Bulgaria GERB The Netherlands SGP
Estonia EK Bulgaria NDST The Netherlands D66
Finalnd SDP Bulgaria DPS The Netherlands VVD
Finland VAS Czech Republic KDU-CSL Poland PO
France PS Czech Republic ODS Portugal CDS-PP
France PCF Denmark KF Portugal PSD
Germany LINKE Denmark RV Romania PNL
Germany SPD Denmark V Romania PD-L
Greece PASOK Estonia IRL Romania PC
Greece SYRIZA Estonia ER Slovakia SDKU-DS
Greece KKE Finalnd KD Slovakia SF
Hungary MSZP Finalnd KOK Slovakia KDH
Ireland LAB France UMP Slovenia SDS
Italy PD Germany CDU Slovenia NSI
Italy RC Germany FDP Slovenia Zares
Latvia SC Greece ND Slovenia LDS
Lithuania LSDP Hungary KDNP Slovenia SLS-SMS
Netherlands PvdA Hungary Fidesz-M Spain PP
Netherlands SP Hungary MDF Sweden KD
Poland SLD Hungary SZDSZ Sweden M
Portugal PS Ireland FG Sweden FP
Portugal BE Ireland FF The United Kingdom CONS
Portugal CDU Italy UDC The United Kingdom UKIP
Romania PSD Italy PDL The United Kingdom LIBDEM
Slovakia Smer Italy IDV — —
Slovakia KSS — — — —
Slovenia SD — — — —
Spain PSOE — — — —
Spain IU — — — —
Sweden SAP — — — —
Sweden V — — — —
UK Lab — — — —
Table A2: (Continued )
Radical Right Parties
Country Party Country Party Country Party
Austria FPO France MPF Lithuania LLS
Austria BZO Greece LAOS The Netherlands PVV
Belgium VB Hungary Jobbik Romania PRM
Belgium FN Italy LN Slovakia SNS
Bulgaria NOA Italy AN Slovenia SNS
Croatia HSP Latvia TB-LNNK — —
Denmark DF Latvia NA — —
Finland PS — — — —
France FN — — —
France MPF — —
Table A3: Logit models predicting left vote
Western Europe Eastern Europe
Countries with left parties
without ethnic afﬁnity
Countries with left parties
with ethnic afﬁnity
Integration −0.113*** — 0.128** — 0.011
(0.027) — (0.052) — (0.081)
Immigration — −0.085*** — 0.184*** 0.011
— (0.024) — (0.045) (0.068)
Member of minority 0.091 0.062 −0.199 −0.127 2.748***
(0.100) (0.100) (0.225) (0.232) (0.243)
Left–Right −0.562*** −0.561*** −0.544*** −0.533*** −0.314***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
Age 0.002 0.001 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Female 0.072 0.095 0.086 0.063 0.179
(0.059) (0.059) (0.099) (0.1) (0.142)
Education −0.080*** −0.083*** −0.181*** −0.132*** 0.041
(0.022) (0.022) (0.045) (0.046) (0.054)
Wealth −0.144*** −0.153*** −0.004 0.005 −0.186***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.044) (0.044) (0.064)
Constant 3.638*** 3.604*** 1.775*** 1.418*** 0.972**
(0.190) (0.193) (0.332) (0.327) (0.467)
Log-likelihood −3487.69 −3467.89 −1322.68 −1276.01 −624.273
Pseudo-R2 0.273 0.272 0.33 0.327 0.269
Observations 7039 6985 2975 2850 1232
Standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05.
Source: European Election Study (2009). Immigration and integration preferences range from liberal to
conservative.
Table A4: Replication of Table 1 in the article using hierarchical linear models
(1) (2)
Positioning on immigration Positioning on integration
Ethnic minorities 0.537*** 0.823***
(0.035) (0.035)
Econ left–right −0.073* −0.034
(0.038) (0.038)
Vote share −0.002 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Vote for radical right 0.031* −0.009
(0.017) (0.018)
Checks −0.129* −0.064
(0.074) (0.077)
Fractionalization 2.945*** 1.106
(1.103) (1.157)
Threshold −0.011 −0.043**
(0.016) (0.017)
Migration 21.398 −20.907
(13.275) (13.923)
Year 2006 −0.011 −0.146
(0.173) (0.175)
Constant 1.375* 1.364*
(0.775) (0.811)
Observations 153 150
Groups 11 11
Log-likelihood −204.851 −201.534
Note: Robust cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
Source: CHES 2006 and 2010. World Bank. Database on Political Institutions. Immigration, integration
and ethnic minorities positions range from liberal to conservative.
Table A5: Replication of Table 2 in paper using hierarchical linear models
(1) (2)
Positioning on immigration Positioning on integration
Econ left–right in western Europe 0.667*** 0.634***
partial slope (0.057) (0.066)
Econ left–right in eastern Europe 0.255* 0.436***
(Left parties with ethnic afﬁnity) (0.131) (0.152)
partial slope
Econ left–right in eastern Europe −0.237*** −0.260***
(Left parties without ethnic afﬁnity) (0.081) (0.094)
partial slope
Eastern Europe with ethnic afﬁnity 2.538*** 1.551*
(0.777) (0.903)
Eastern Europe without ethnic afﬁnity 5.162*** 5.325***
(0.582) (0.672)
Vote share 0.014* 0.006
(0.008) (0.010)
Vote for radical right 0.041*** 0.039**
(0.015) (0.018)
Checks −0.027 −0.066
(0.106) (0.123)
Fractionalization 1.605 1.438
(1.501) (1.747)
Threshold −0.035 −0.055**
(0.022) (0.026)
Proportional representation −1.092* −2.378***
(0.574) (0.668)
Migration 12.725 18.257
(9.905) (11.516)
Year 2006 −0.176 −0.018
(0.186) (0.218)
Constant 1.357 3.213***
(0.949) (1.104)
Observations 328 325
Groups 22 22
Log-likelihood −634.280 −677.435
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
Source: CHES 2006 and 2010. World Bank. Database on Political Institutions. Immigration and
integration positions range from liberal to conservative. Partial Slopes estimated using Stata’s margins
command.
Table A6: Replication of Table 3 in paper using hierarchical linear models
(1) (2)
Immigration salience Integration salience
Position on immigration −1.037*** —
(0.270) —
Position on immigration2 0.131*** —
(0.024) —
Position on integration — −0.554**
— (0.237)
Position on integration2 — 0.070***
— (0.022)
Ethnic salience 0.173*** 0.406***
(0.043) (0.058)
Econ left–right 0.052 0.017
(0.033) (0.040)
Vote share 0.003 −0.001
(0.007) (0.008)
Vote for radical right 0.026 0.042
(0.021) (0.026)
Checks −0.041 0.034
(0.112) (0.147)
Fractionalization 1.419 5.537**
(1.898) (2.655)
Threshold −0.074** −0.042
(0.031) (0.045)
Migration 15.446 17.080
(20.937) (27.486)
Year 2006 −0.133 1.521***
(0.179) (0.225)
Constant 3.849*** −1.711
(1.462) (1.929)
Observations 153 150
Groups 11 11
Log-likelihood −191.812 −214.983
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05.
Source: CHES 2006 and 2010. World Bank. Database on Political Institutions. Immigration and
integration positions range from liberal to conservative.
